Using the 2000 introduction of means tested child benefits in Russia as a case study; this paper assesses the impact of a policy change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction. We focus on the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and program costs, and related these to the benefits in terms of poverty reduction. We use the cross-section and panel dimensions of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to 2004 to analyse the impact of the reforms and to simulate the effects of various means-tested and universal child benefit schemes. Our analysis contributes to the academic debate in two ways. First, we compare means tested and universal schemes both in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects. Second, we analyse the poverty reduction impact of these schemes also in terms of chronic poverty. We find that, since the reforms, more children receive benefits and that there is improved targeting of benefits to children living in low income households.
Introduction
The debate whether universal or means-tested benefits are the preferred policy instrument in reducing (child) poverty is a longstanding one and centres around costs, incentives and the political economy. Under the condition of a constrained budget and assuming (near) perfect targeting, poverty is reduced more effectively and efficiently when benefits are targeted to the poor based on means (see, e.g., Besley, 1990) . Higher administrative costs, targeting errors and labour market disincentives reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of means-tested benefits (Atkinson, 1998; Van de Walle, 1998) . Proponents of universal benefits argue that the costs related to means testing may outweigh the actual benefit. Using the 2000 introduction of means tested child benefits in Russia as a case study; this paper assesses the impact of a policy change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction. We focus on the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and program costs, and related these to the benefits in terms of poverty reduction.
Our focus is on child benefits because, as in many other countries, children in Russia are particularly at risk of living in poverty. In 2003, the poverty incidence among children younger than 16 years old was 27% compared to the national average of 20%. Younger children have an even higher risk of living in poverty (World Bank, 2004) . Family allowances are the main instrument in most social protection systems to provide income support to families with children. Child benefits and other family policies always played an important role in Russian (and Soviet) social policy. In 2000, the eligibility requirements for child benefits in Russia changed from universal to means-tested allocation.
We compare means tested and universal schemes both in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects for a vulnerable group in the population, namely children. Using the cross-section and panel dimensions of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to, we investigate changes in targeting efficiency and poverty reduction over time.
We measure targeting efficiency using a range of coverage and adequacy indicators; by calculating these indicators for two poverty lines and the quintiles of the expenditure distribution we gain insight in the scope of inclusion and exclusion errors. The poverty reduction impact is measured in three dimensions; poverty incidence, poverty gap and chronic poverty. Finally, we also simulate various means tested and universal child benefit schemes and analyze differences in poverty reduction and total benefit expenditures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly we review the main arguments of the debate between proponents of universal and targeted cash benefits as most effective and efficient instruments to support poor households and we discuss which aspects of this debate have been empirically investigated and which not. Then, we discuss the data and variables used in our analysis followed by a discussion of the poverty indicators used as well as their trends from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Section five and six respectively analyse the targeting performance and poverty reduction effects of the current child benefit scheme in Russia. Section seven simulates different policy options and compares their targeting performance with the current system. The final section summarizes the main findings.
Universal versus means-tested cash benefits
The debate whether universal or means-tested child benefits are the preferred policy instrument in reducing child poverty, is a longstanding one and centers around costs, incentives and the political economy (see for instance Atkinson, 1998; Barr, 1998; Besley, 1990; Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Coady et al, 2004; van de Walle, 1998) . Strictly speaking, a policy maker has two choices: she can allocate a benefit to all children of a certain age-group, i.e. provide a universal benefit, or limit the eligibility to children of poor families. Under a given government budget constraint, allocating the benefits to poor children will result in a higher benefit for each eligible child, and hence, will result in a larger effect on poverty reduction. However, targeting comes at a cost.
If benefits are targeted to the poor, the policy maker will have to determine an indicator that identifies the poor children. Governments have imperfect information about the true welfare level of households. It is difficult to find out whether a person or household belongs to the target group or not, and gathering such information is costly. In addition to screening costs, other inefficiencies arise as a result of imperfect targeting: some of the benefits will flow to children outside the target group while some children in the target group will not get a benefit.
The former inefficiency is called 'leakage' or 'inclusion error' while the latter is known as 'exclusion error'. When screening costs are high and there are errors of in-and exclusion, universal benefits become more attractive as a benefit allocation mechanism. Moreover, as targeting becomes stricter in order to reduce leakage, screening costs rise further and exclusion errors as well. Therefore, the decision between universal or targeted child benefits is ultimately a cost benefit analysis; when do the costs of targeting outweigh the benefits in terms of poverty reduction?
It makes sense that a targeting regime which aims at poverty relief needs to use poverty indicators as a screening device. There are, however, a number of pitfalls involved in poverty measurement that need to be considered. One issue is that poverty is a multidimensional concept; another is that there are various ways to measure each of these dimensions.
Additionally, to determine whether a person is poor or not involves the (subjective) choice of a poverty threshold below which a person cannot fulfil his/her basic needs, has poor health or an unacceptable low standard of living. Firstly, this implies that it is a priori not clear who the target group is (one first needs to determine the relevant dimension(s)). Secondly, the target group differs in size and characteristics according to the chosen measurement method and poverty threshold.
The academic literature also identifies other targeting costs such as incentive costs, social costs and political costs (Atkinson, 1998; Barr, 1998; Coady et al, 2004, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; Sen, 1995) . Incentive costs arise when households adjust their behaviour in order to meet eligibility criteria. These responses can involve a cost (i.e. a household reduces labour supply such that their income falls below the eligibility threshold) but can also be beneficial (i.e. school attendance increases because benefit eligibility requires the children to go to school). Strict targeting might also increase social costs such as stigma and reduce the available budget for transfers if the budget is politically determined (Gelbach and Pritchett; 1997, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Atkinson, 1995; Sen, 1995) .
In addition, poverty alleviation may not be the only objective of child and other social benefits. Most social protection systems have several functions. They alleviate poverty, smooth income over the life cycle, provide insurance against certain risks and redistribute welfare. A benefit that is said to be 'poorly targeted' based on the poverty objective may be effective in terms of another objective (Atkinson, 1998) . In this respect, child benefit programmes can also have wider objectives, like smoothing income over the life cycle, welfare redistribution or increasing fertility rates.
In this paper we analyse the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and program costs, and relate these to the benefits in terms of poverty reduction. We limit our focus because the data allow for a thorough analysis of these aspects while they do not provide information on the other factors in the debate. Although there are various other targeting methods (see for instance Coady et al, 2004) , we focus on means-testing and compare the efficiency of this targeting method to one of universal provision in the context of child benefits in Russia.
Our analysis contributes to the debate in a number of ways. Firstly, many studies focus either on targeting efficiency or on poverty reduction (Coady et al, 2004; Foster et al, 2001; Immervol et al, 2000; Edmonds, 2005) . The discussion above suggests that there is a trade off between targeting efficiency and poverty reduction for means-tested and universal child benefits which implies that it is relevant to measure the effects of both. Secondly, other contributions only focus on the effects of means-tested benefits or contrast the role of meanstested benefits to other parts of the welfare state such as social insurance programs (Behrendt, 2000; Sainsbury et al, 2002; Nelson, 2004; Heady et al, 2001) . Such analyses are useful in the sense that they provide information about how social protection programmes can complement each other or about the variation in impact of different means-tested schemes. However, they do not provide insights into the differences in impact of means-tested vis-à-vis universal cash benefit programs for a specific group in the population. In this paper we analyse the impact of universal and means-tested child benefits using various targeting efficiency and poverty reduction indicators. We analyse the impact of the reforms in the Russian child benefit program (from universal to means-tested benefits) and simulate the impact of various meanstested and universal child benefit schemes. Another contribution of this paper is that, in addition to the poverty incidence and poverty gaps indicators, we also analyse the poverty reduction impact of these schemes in terms of chronic poverty. The chronic poor, measured in this paper as those households that have average expenditures below the poverty line, are of particular interest because of the potentially high costs that long-term poverty has on the development of children.
Nevertheless, the empirical literature provides some clues with respect to differences in targeting efficiency and poverty reduction impact between means-tested and universal benefits. Matsaganis et al (2004) and Edmonds (2005) indeed find that under means-tested programs leakage of benefits to the non-poor is considerably lower than under a universal programme. Related to that is the result that a higher share of the benefits goes to the poor with means-tested child benefits (Matsaganis et al, 2004) . However, in a cross-national comparison of 122 anti-poverty interventions Coady et al (2004, p. 32, table 3.4) show that in terms of median targeting performance both means-tested benefits and child benefits score highest as compared with other targeting methods but both methods have approximately equal scores. Thus, both means-tested and child benefits distribute more resources to the poor than random assignment or other targeting methods. However because their definition of child benefit programs includes all types of child benefits (universal, (proxy) The problem of exclusion or under coverage receives attention in studies like Behrendt (2000) and Edmonds (2005) , albeit from different perspectives: Behrendt evaluates the poverty reduction impact of means-tested benefits and notes that recipient rates are 'astonishingly low' (i.e. exclusion rates are high, p. 31). Edmonds, being more concerned about the targeting efficiency of means-tested child benefits in Slovenia, mentions that the problem of under coverage does not appear 'to be so large that it could undermine the progressiveness of the means-tested programme ' (p. 195) . Additionally, both studies report that leakage of meanstested benefits is mainly to the 'near poor' population and thus less of an (efficiency) problem. It is important to realize that the problem of under-coverage represents a missed opportunity in terms of poverty reduction while at the same time it is the result of (increased) targeting efficiency. By comparing means-tested and universal schemes, our study therefore also analyzes the potential poverty reduction that can be achieved by universal schemes.
The empirical literature suggests that the impact of means tested and universal schemes on various poverty measures differs. Forster and Toth (2001) identify a move from universal to means tested benefits in the Visegrad countries 2 during the mid-nineties and find that the impact on poverty in terms of incidence was reduced after reforms but that benefits were better targeted in terms of intensity and thus had a larger impact on the reduction of the poverty gap. In the study of Matsaganis et al (2004) instance provides special benefits to households with 3 or more children). Another point that is addressed by the empirical literature is that the program implementation matters a lot, also for targeting efficiency and poverty reduction (Coady et al, 2004; Behrendt, 2000) .
A final aspect is that the size of benefits clearly matters; more generous benefits have a larger impact on poverty (Matsaganis et al, 2004) . On the other hand, higher benefits put a larger strain on the government budget. If the benefit is small, the costs of strict means-testing may outweigh the benefit, both for the beneficiary and the administrator. As for the means test itself, essential for its validation is the underlying objective. Does the means test aim at targeting the poor or is it meant to cut-off the wealthy households and to redirect some of the resources to poorer households? The latter 'mild' targeting may offer an alternative that comes close to an optimum as discussed by Besley and Kanbur (1990) . In addition, the amount of leakage of benefits to households close to the poverty line may not be considered as a cost under the presumption that the poverty line is not a stringent concept. This 'mild' evaluation takes into account that income may not be perfectly observable and that there is no such thing as a single poverty line. This study therefore uses various benefit levels in its simulations, measures the poverty reduction impact using two poverty lines and also analyses targeting efficiency in terms of the expenditure distribution in the population.
Russia -from universal to means-tested child allowances
Child allowances and other family policies always played a prominent role in Russian (and Soviet) social policy. The objective of providing child allowances is to assist families in having and upbringing children (Karelova, 2003) . The main law regulating child and family allowances was passed in 1995.
3 Up to 1999, child allowances were officially allocated according the universal principle but as early as 1995 some regional governments decided to means-test child benefits (Denisova et al, 2002) . In 1999, federal law officially introduced a means test for child allowances. The eligibility rules changed two more times before they were finally set and approved in the amended law (2000). In 2001, child allowances started to be financed from the federal budget. 
Data and methodology
3 This legislation describes a package of family and maternity benefits; we only focus on the monthly child benefits to families with children below 16 years (or 18 if still in school). 4 The allocation of the funds is based on applications from the regions. Transfers are earmarked and cannot be used for other purposes than targeted child allowances. This financing procedure was legally established in 2002. 5 Our analysis covers the period 2000-2004 but reforms in child benefits continued to take place. In 2005, "the authority to finance and legislatively regulate this benefit was transferred to the level of the Russian Federation constituent entities" (Ovcharova et al, 2005, p. 7) . 6 As a result, the value of the MSL may differ per region, and sometimes even within region. This may be the case if the region covers several climatic zones, as for example in the Republic of Komi (Gassmann, 2003:10) . 7 The allowance is only 70 rubles for unemployed workers. The RLMS includes variables on household demographics, expenditures, income, poverty lines, child benefit receipt and some variables on household labour market participation and education. We measure the poverty status of a household using the RLMS poverty lines and household expenditures. The RLMS poverty lines are based on regional age-gender specific food-baskets that are valued at regional prices. 11 We prefer to use expenditures instead of income because households have a tendency to underreport income from informal and semiformal activities (among others Ravallion, 1994; Deaton, 1997; Atkinson et al, 1995A) .
Household income is therefore systematically below expenditures, which is a common feature of these data. Total expenditures are composed of food and non-food goods and services.
Total food consumption is obtained by adding the expenditures on all foodstuffs, both purchased and from home produced consumption. Total non-food consumption is obtained by summing expenditures on tobacco, clothing, fuel, health, services, luxury goods, rent, and utilities.
12 8 The data are publicly available and can be obtained through anonymous FTP server from the RLMS website. Detailed information on the RLMS project is provided on the following website: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/home.html. 9 To obtain representative estimates, we use the RLMS post-stratification weights. 10 Unlike the cross-section component where a household drops out when it moves from the sampled dwelling site, the panel does include households who moved and were interviewed in subsequent rounds. 11 These individual poverty lines are aggregated for each member to the household level and subsequently multiplied by a factor to adjust for economies of scale. The adjustment factor varies between 1 for single person households and 0.7 for households with 6 or more members. Every year the poverty lines are updated using the consumer price index. 12 Not included are gifts or loans provided to other households, expenditures for tax and insurance, and savings and expenditures on stocks and bonds because these expenses are not made for the benefit of the household or are not used for current consumption. Also excluded are expenditures on durables because the consumption benefits from such goods extend over multiple periods.
We focus on households with children aged 16 years or 18 if still in high school because these are the households that are potentially eligible for child benefits. 13 The level of benefit differs with the age of the child; children under 1.5 get a higher benefit than older children.
Unfortunately, we can only distinguish between the benefits received by these age categories from 2003 on. 14 To maintain consistency over time we therefore decided to use the slightly larger group of households with children below 16 (or 18 if in high school) for our targeting and poverty impact analyses. 
Prevalence of (chronic) poverty in families with children
This section describes poverty in Russia during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . We analyze poverty trends in poverty incidence and poverty gap indicators (Foster et al, 1984) 15 as well as a spells-based 13 The main characteristics of the households in the cross-section and panel dimensions are summarized in the appendix. Comparing the characteristics of the weighted cross-section and panel samples shows some differences; in the panel urban households are underrepresented while households with children are somewhat overrepresented. Income and expenditures are somewhat lower in the panel. The main trends are similar in both datasets.
14 From 2003 on the household questionnaire makes a distinction between child benefits received for children below 1.5 years and benefits received for children between 1.5 and 16 years old (or 18 if still in high school). 15 The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of decomposable poverty indices (1984) can be represented as follows:
, where n is the total number of individuals, q is the number of poor, z is the poverty line and c represents our expenditures aggregate. If α = 0 the equation represents the headcount index which simply displays the chronic poverty indicator (Hulme and Sheperd, 2003) . We have calculated these poverty statistics for the RLMS poverty lines as well as for 150% of the RLMS poverty lines. We do this for two reasons. Firstly, poverty statistics are sensitive to the level of poverty threshold and we want to evaluate in what way changing the threshold level influences our poverty estimates. Secondly, the Russian authorities use a different threshold (Minimum Subsistence Level) to establish whether a family falls below the income threshold and is thus eligible for child benefits. The 150% RLMS cut-off is comparable to the Minimum Subsistence Level and thus better reflects the target group at which the child benefit program is aimed. , about 150% of the average weighted RLMS threshold (2,007 ruble). The RLMS data were collected in November-December 2000. Note that this is only an approximation because the RLMS poverty lines assume larger economies of scale then the MSL; depending on the household size each RLMS household member receives a weight between 0.7 and 1 while according to the MSL method each member receives a weight of 1. Therefore even when the thresholds would be the same, household with children are more likely to be poor using the MSL method than the RLMS method. the poverty line; a shift the poverty line thereby has a large impact on poverty indicators. 17 In comparison with the total population, children have a higher than average or average poverty risk, depending on the survey year.
18 as Russia with a highly unequal expenditure distribution but where differences between household expenditures at the lower end of the distribution are relatively small. We therefore checked the consistency of our estimates with other poverty studies (World Bank, 2004; Gassmann, 2003) . These studies find higher poverty rates in general as well as an increased poverty risk for children but the trends in poverty indices are very similar to ours. We found that a large part of these differences could be attributed to differences in expenditures (particularly the value of home produced goods as well as level of detail in the questionnaire) and to some extent to a lower threshold in the RLMS. 18 We also analyzed poverty decompositions by number of children and household type (not shown here). Households consisting of only parents and (a few) children have a below average poverty risk but households with 3 or more children, single parents, extended families and other household with children have a higher than average poverty risk. 19 Because of the structure of our data, we first classified households according to our chronic poverty groups and then calculated the incidence of individuals or children living in such a group. Although the number of households is constant in our panel, the number of individuals is not. Therefore the % of individuals or children living in either category differs slightly per survey round.
the largest group with 30% while 7.3% can be classified as chronic poor i.e. those households with mean expenditures under the poverty line. Using the higher poverty line, about 22% of Russians lived in chronic poverty and 38% experienced occasional poverty spells. Clearly, children have a higher than average risk to live in either of the poverty groups; they are more likely to live in chronic poor and occasionally poor households.
Targeting efficiency of child allowance
We have seen that, even though quite some local administrations already introduced some form of means testing during the mid-nineties, only in 1999 child benefits became means- (exclusion error). By calculating the % of poor beneficiaries we can get insight into these targeting aspects (using the same poverty thresholds as in the previous section). Under a means-tested scheme, leakage of benefits to 'near poor' children is typically considered less problematic than leakage of resources to 'rich' children (among others Atkinson, 1998 and Behrendt, 2000) . In addition, the poverty analysis in the previous section has shown that the size of the target population is very sensitive to the choice of the poverty line. We therefore complement our analyses of targeting efficiency by decomposing our indicators into expenditure quintiles.
Households in Russia with children under 16 (or 18 if the child is still going to high school) are potentially eligible for child benefits under the current means-tested scheme, but all would be eligible under a universal benefit. Therefore, this group is our benchmark for calculating coverage rates, our first indicator of targeting efficiency. Table 4 shows that benefit coverage increased over the whole period; the % of children receiving child benefits doubles from 33% in 2000 to 66% in 2004. From 2001 on, poor children are more likely to receive benefits then their non-poor counterparts. This suggests that there have been two effects. Firstly, there has been a general increase in the number of benefits provided. It is likely that the move from local to federal funding of (earmarked) benefits has been an important contribution in this respect. 20 Secondly, the increase in coverage of poor children as compared to overall coverage rates suggests that the means test indeed helps to target the poor.
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Nevertheless, one third to a quarter of the poor children does not receive a benefit. It is not clear whether these children were denied a benefit when their parents filed an application or for what reasons the parents decided not to file an application. The only insight that the RLMS provides is whether the household thinks it is eligible for child benefits. 22 In 2004, 32% of the non-poor households with children thought they were not eligible as compared to 23% of the poor households. This suggests that lack of information might be one reason for non-take up but it is not clear whether this is the only reason.
The distributional decomposition confirms that child benefits are progressive; children in lower quintiles have higher coverage rates. There is nevertheless considerable leakage to the 3 rd to 5 th quintiles. In most years, these quintiles have expenditures well above the 150% RLMS poverty line.
Coverage rates only show one aspect of targeting efficiency (who receives benefits?). The selected adequacy indicators show how much benefit is received in three dimensions; the absolute level of benefits, the level of benefits as compared to total expenditures and the share of total benefits going to the (lowest) expenditure quintiles. A first indicator of benefit adequacy is the benefit level. We only report median benefit levels because there are a number of outliers in the reported child benefits which cannot be fully explained by eventual supplementary benefits, birth grants or maternity benefits (from local authorities or employers Denisova et al (2000) mention that funding problems greatly reduced provision of child benefits during the mid-nineties. 21 Incidence rates look at benefit receipt over the total population while coverage rates focus on benefit receipt among children or households with children. The trends in terms of incidence rates (not shown here) are similar to the coverage rates but they differ in level; they increased from less than 13% in 2000 to 21% in 2004. There was a strong increase in benefit receipt among (consumption) poor households. To what extent do program benefits flow to households in the target group and which part of the benefits is spent on beneficiaries outside the target group? The benefit share per quintile in table 4 shows which % of the program resources is flowing to the target group and which % of the resources leaks away to richer households. Using the higher poverty line, which corresponds better to the income threshold used by Russian authorities, we can see that about half of the benefits flow to poor households in 2000 but this share declines to about a third in 2004. From the decomposition into quintiles we can see that over the observed period about 50% of the benefits are going to the poorest 40% of the population. Possible explanations for this could be that the means-test is not stringently applied in Russia, or alternatively, benefit receipt is rather sticky (maybe there is no regular re-evaluation of households' means).
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In addition to the descriptive indicators of targeting efficiency we also want to test if there is statistical evidence for the changes in the targeting efficiency of child benefits. 26 We estimate a binary model with child benefit receipt as a dependent variable and a number of explanatory 23 We also checked whether there is a difference in the median benefit per child for poor and non-poor children (we checked for both poverty lines). Table 9 in the appendix. 25 We analyzed patterns of benefit receipt in our household panel and found that the large majority of households continue to receive benefits in subsequent years. Of those households receiving child allowance in 2000, 53% still received child allowances in 2004. Of those who did not receive benefits anymore, 26% still had children in the eligible age category but did not receive benefits while 21% of those households did not have any children in the eligible age category anymore. Over time, stability of benefit receipt has further increased. Those households who lost benefit receipt but still had eligible children, had higher expenditures on average. Unfortunately we do not know if these households did not re-apply or whether their application was denied. 26 We use a binary choice model to find out which household characteristics increase the probability of child benefit receipt. Such a model can be written as
, where Y is the dependent variable, λ the standard normal cumulative distribution function, x a vector of explanatory variables and β a vector of parameters to be estimated (Greene, 1997) . The dependent variable takes on Y=1 when the household receives a child benefit and Y=0 when it does not receive one.
variables such as the number of eligible children and other demographic characteristics, the logarithm of nominal income minus child benefits 27 , a dummy for the poverty status of the household, a dummy taking the value of 1 if at least one household member is unemployed, a dummy for female headed household, dummies indicating a semi urban and rural dwelling place and dummies for the primary sampling units. We only include households that have children in the eligible age category i.e. under age 16 or 18 if the child is still in high school. Our estimation strategy is rather straightforward; for each cross-section we use Probit regressions to estimate a number of models. In our first model the main explanatory variables are the number of children in the eligible age category and household income. The second model replaces household income with a dummy variable on the poverty status of the household. The third model includes in addition to the number of children in the eligible age category, household income and a number of control variables that potentially can be correlated with the dependent variable.
28 As we repeat the estimation for each year, changes in sign, magnitude and significance of the estimated parameters can be interpreted as indicators for policy change. The results are reported in table 5 and display the estimation results in marginal effects indicating the change in the probability for a small change in each independent, continuous variable and, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
As expected, the number of eligible children in the household is positively correlated with benefit receipt for all models and every survey year; households with more children are more 
Impact of child allowances on (chronic) poverty
This section evaluates the impact of child benefits in terms of poverty from 2000 to 2004. So far we have seen that the size of child allowances is rather modest and that its real value is decreasing over time. Does this mean that the poverty reduction effect of the benefits also decreased? We analyze the impact of child benefits on poverty by comparing expenditures before and after child benefits. This is a static analysis; it does not take into account any behavioural changes of households in the absence of child benefits nor any responses to changes in the benefit level or eligibility criteria. We investigate the poverty reduction impact of the benefit on the incidence of poverty, the poverty gap and the incidence of chronic poverty, both in terms of the total population as well as children. 29 For the poverty gap indices we excluded households for which the reported amount of child benefits could be classified as an extreme outlier. Outliers were identified using the 'iqr' syntax in stata 9.0. 'iqr' indicates outliers as severe when they "comprise about .0002% of the normal population. In samples, they lie far out enough to have a substantial effect on means, standard deviations, and other classical statistics." (Stata 9.0 Viewer). 
Simulation alternative child benefit programs
The previous section showed that there was (some) improvement in terms of poverty reduction over time. Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.
The impact on child poverty and chronic child poverty under current and simulated policy options is summarized in tables 34 Note that the differences in poverty reduction reported in the current program and those reported in the section on poverty impact arise. Firstly, because in this section we exclude children aged less than 18 months and the child benefits distributed to these children. Secondly, we replaced the reported benefit amount by 70 ruble per child because we did not want measurement error in the reported benefits to have an influence on the comparison with the other simulated programs.
situations here, one in which we keep the level of child benefits at its current level of 70 ruble per child, and the other one in which we adjust the benefit level such that the impact on total benefit expenditures is neutral. In comparison to the current program, poverty incidence and poverty gap among children would be further reduced with 0.1 percentage point with the 70 ruble universal benefit scheme (irrespective of the poverty line used). For the budget neutral scheme, the poverty reduction effects are equal or less as compared to the current meanstested scheme. The 70 ruble universal scheme also further reduces chronic and occasional poverty while the effects of the budget neutral scheme are less clear cut. Table Table 8 summarizes the total benefit expenditures per scheme. We estimated current expenditures on child benefits by multiplying the number of children in Russian with the child coverage rate and the legal nominal benefit per child (70 ruble for in the 70 ruble universal scheme.
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So far we have seen that the overall poverty reduction impact of the 70 and 42 ruble schemes is modest. We therefore also investigated the impact of doubling of child benefits from 70 to 140 ruble. For the means tested scheme we assume that the households currently receiving a child benefit will also receive the doubled child benefit. This, in fact, may lead to an underestimation in the poverty reduction effect as well as in the estimated program costs as the benefit increase is likely to induce more households to file an application. We do not take these second order effects into account. As expected the poverty reduction effects of both means tested and universal schemes increases as compared to the current scheme. The absolute poverty reduction effect of the universal scheme is doubled (or more) for both poverty indicators and both poverty lines. Again, the universal scheme outperforms the means-tested scheme. The effects are similar for chronic poverty, particularly the chronic poor benefit from an increase in the benefit level. Total benefit expenditures more than triple under the 140 ruble universal scheme as compared to a doubling of the means tested scheme.
These simulations illustrate a number of relevant issues. Clearly, total benefit expenditures on benefits are higher under universal programs and, in this respect, less efficient. A point that received far less attention in the universal -means tested debates is that when targeting is not perfect (i.e. there are errors of exclusion), universal schemes outperform means tested schemes in terms of poverty reduction. The additional poverty reduction is achieved because those who were by error excluded under the means tested scheme now do receive a benefit.
While keeping the capacity of means testing constant, this paper estimated and compared both effects. The results also show that the difference in poverty reduction effect between means tested and universal benefits increases as the benefit level increases. Whether the additional benefit expenditures are worth the extra poverty reduction, is a decision to be made by society. An important limitation of our simulations is that we can only speculate what the effect of these schemes would be on program's administration costs. Moving from the current scheme to the 70 ruble universal benefit scheme would have two opposing effects; firstly administration costs rise as more households apply under the universal child benefit scheme and secondly, the abolishment of the income test will reduce the workload per application.
With current coverage rates (56% of the households), local administration offices can expect an increase in applications of 79% (if every household with children in this category would actually apply). It is a priori not clear whether the increment in administration costs due to more applications outweighs the decreased costs due to a reduced workload. A doubling of in the benefit level will increase administrative costs in both scenarios compared to current expenditures on administration; even comparing to the current scheme higher benefits induce more households to file an application, even if the scheme is means tested. 
Conclusion
Using the 2000 introduction of means tested child benefits in Russia as a case study; this paper assessed the impact of a policy change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction. We focused on the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and program costs, and related these to the benefits in terms of poverty reduction. Our analysis has been comprehensive; using both the distribution we gained insight in the scope of inclusion and exclusion errors. The poverty reduction impact was measured in three dimensions; poverty incidence, poverty gap and chronic poverty. Finally, we also simulated various means tested and universal child benefit schemes and analyzed differences in poverty reduction and total benefit expenditures.
The universal schemes achieve additional reductions in poverty because those who were by error excluded under the means tested scheme now receive a benefit. Doubling benefits makes the poverty reduction impact more substantial. At the same time, differences in poverty reduction effect between means tested and universal benefits increase as the benefit level increases. We also estimated the total benefit expenditures for the simulated programs.
One qualification of this study is that we did not investigate the effect of incentives, social and political targeting costs because of data limitations. We measured the program impact in terms of poverty but child benefit programs can also have other objectives. In his state of the nation's address in 2006, president Putin explicitly mentioned the problem of low fertility rates in Russia and he proposed benefit increases over the whole range of family programs (maternity leave, birth grants and child benefits). 38 Another issue is that in this case study we hold the targeting capacity of the benefit providers constant. Differences in the targeting capacity between countries and/or institutions alter the targeting and poverty reduction results.
Moreover, targeting capacities can improve over time. And finally, how administration costs differ under means tested and universal schemes remains an issue for further research.
To what extent is a means test of child benefits in Russia desirable? We show that abolishing means testing would improve the (chronic) poverty reduction performance of child allowances, but doubling the benefit would have an even stronger effect. We find it difficult to argue why a program with benefits as low as current benefit levels, should be means tested.
Given the characteristics of the expenditure distribution in a country such as Russia, where inequality is high and the welfare differences between households at the lower end of the distribution are small, many benefits leak to 'near' poor households. Leakage is also lower because households with children are disproportionately more present at the lower part of this distribution. Moreover, the road of economic transition in Russia has been rather bumpy and led to a surge in uncertainty, also in terms of living standards. In that respect, even when child benefits are modest, they can assist families with children to smooth consumption by providing a stable source of cash income (Notten and de Crombrugghe, 2006) . Universal benefits would also be more appropriate if Russia wants to counteract the decreasing fertility rates.
